Factoring - the ancients

- The original method for factoring *n* was just to try all primes up to \sqrt{n} . This worked well before the computer era.
- One factoring trick that has survived from before modern times was known to Fermat; it is based on the fact that if n = pq and p > q then

$$n = \frac{(p+q)^2}{4} - \frac{(p-q)^2}{4}$$

- If you want to factor *n*, consider the sequence $n+1, n+4, \ldots, n+k^2, \ldots$ and look for a square. If you find one then you can factor *n*.
- If n = pq then this will succeed in at most (p q)/2 steps.
- The take-away for RSA then is not to make your primes be too similar in size.

Factoring - Pollard: the ρ algorithm

- Suppose that *n* has a prime factor *p*. If we pick numbers $0 < b_1, b_2, b_3, \ldots < n$ then eventually we will have for some $i < j, b_i \equiv b_j \mod p$ and we will get that *p* divides $gcd(b_i b_j, n)$.
- In this way, if n is not prime, we can find a prime factor. If p is not too big, it isn't hard to find it at least probabilistically.
- This is the birthday problem: what is the probability that *k* numbers, chosen less than *n* are not congruent mod *p*?

$$(1-1/p)(1-2/p)\cdots(1-(k-1)/p)\approx e^{-k^2/2p}.$$

• If $k \approx 4\sqrt{p}$ then this probability is < .0004.

Factoring - Pollard, cont'd

- This assumes that our choices of the sequence of b_i's is drawn from a uniform distribution on the integers from 1 to n.
- In practice, this is hard to achieve in a computationally simple way.
- What is done is the following: start with some integer *x*₀ less than *n*. This can be randomly chosen but is often just set to 2.
- Choose some "generic" polynomial f and compute $x_{i+1} \equiv f(x_i) \mod n$ recursively.
- In practice, a sufficiently generic polynomial is x² + 1. The distribution of values modulo *n* is pseudo-random and is good enough for what we are doing.

Factoring - Pollard, example

• $x_0 = 2$ and n = 1079.

• $x_1 = x_0^2 + 1 \mod 1079$, $x_2 = x_1^2 + 1 \mod 1079$, etc.

• So the sequence is 2, 5, 26, 677, 833...

Δ	2	5	26	677
2				
5	3			
26	24	21		
677	675	672	651	
833	831	828	807	156

• gcd(1079, 156) = 13 and $1079 = 13 \times 83$.

Factoring - Pollard: the p-1 algorithm

 We are trying to factor *n*. Choose some integer *a* such that 1 < a < n - 1 and a bound *B*. Do the following computation:

•
$$b_1 \equiv a \mod n, b_2 \equiv b_1^2 \mod n, ..., b_j \equiv b_{j-1}^j \mod n, ...$$

 $b_B \equiv b_{B-1}^B \mod n.$

- Notice that $b_i \equiv a^{i!} \mod n$ for all *i*.
- Now if *p* divides *n* and *p* − 1 divides *B*! then by Fermat's little theorem a^{p−1} ≡ 1 mod *p* and hence b_B ≡ 1 mod *p*.
- This means that p divides b_B 1 and so the gcd of b_B 1 and n is a factor of n.

Factoring - Pollard: the p-1 algorithm, cont'd

- Since in practice you don't know what p is, you try to set a bound B so that there is a high chance that p 1 divides B!. This will happen if p 1 has small factors.
- At each stage, you compute $b_i \equiv b_{i-1}^i \mod n$ and then determine $gcd(b_i 1, n)$ and see if it is not 1.
- Example: n = 295927, a = 2 and set the bound at 10 (no more than 10 steps). In this case, $n = 541 \times 547$ and $540 = 2^23^35$ so in fact 9! will work. Try it yourself!
- To thwart this attack, you need to guarantee to when you pick p, p 1 has at least one large prime factor. One way to do this is to only look for primes of the form kp + 1 where k is allowed to vary and p is some fixed large prime.

- Average: 16.1
- ≥ 20: 26
- 17 19: 22
- 14 16: 18
- ≤ 13: 20