Colloquium - Georges Zaccour - Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees
Title: Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees
Abstract: Many problems in economics, engineering and management science have the following three features in common: (a) They involve a few agents (players) who have interdependent payoffs. (b) The agents cooperate or compete repeatedly over time, and the problem involves an accumulation process, e.g., production capacity, pollution stock. (c) Some of the parameter values are uncertain. A natural framework to deal with such problems is the theory of dynamic games played over event trees (DGPETs).
If the players decide to coordinate their strategies by signing a long-term contract, then they must ensure that all players follow their cooperative commitments as time goes by.
In this talk, I discuss different approaches to sustain cooperation over time in DGPETs.
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